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 Purpose: The purpose of this study is to investigate long run shareholders’ 
wealth effect (SWE) of Malaysian acquiring firms following cross-border 
acquisition (CBA). 
Methodology: Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) measure of 
SWE and Euclidean distance method for identifying matching firms, the 
study investigated 176 CBA deals of Malaysian acquiring firms for the 
years 2004-2015. Both parametric tests (such as conventional t-statistics, 
skewness adjusted t-statistics, bootstrapping skewness adjusted t-statistics 
and Multivariate of Analysis of Variance) and non-parametric statistical 
(such as Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) tools were employed to analyze the 
data and test the hypotheses regarding the impact of CBA deals on acquiring 
firms’ SWE. 
Results: The research found that the SWE of acquiring firms is significantly 
positive in the shorter period while negative or mixed in the longer period. 
Furthermore, SWE is found to be different across several groups: (i) 
Shariah-complaint status firms vs. conventional firms (ii) level of control in 
target firm (such as major vs. minor acquisitions), (iii) Diversifying 
acquisition (for example, related vs unrelated acquisition). However, SWE 
does not differ from industry to industry. 
Implications:This research presents unique empirical evidences related to 
long run SWE of Malaysian acquiring firms following CBA. The findings 
imply that CBA is more success in the longer period. 
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1. Introduction  
Acquiring firms face challenges posed by the new pattern of globalization, which has led to greater 
integration of their operations and control. Subsequently, corporate sector all over the world is 
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restructuring its operations through different types of consolidation strategies. Cross-border acquisitions 
(CBA) is one of the most popular forms of such strategy. The CBA activities are expanding due to the de-
regulation of different government approaches as a facilitator of the neo-liberal economic regime among 
firms. The role of such CBA is also encouraging for longer-term reforms, such as operational 
restructuring, reallocation of assets, and wealth increase in firms (Mody & Negishi, 2001). 
 
In consonance with this, outbound foreign direct investment, in the form of CBA, has a significant role to 
play in the restructuring and continued development of the Malaysian economy (Rahim, Ahmad, & 
Ahmad, 2016). It allows capital to be reallocated more freely to its highest use in economic terms. 
Reducing barriers for companies to transform and adjust to changing markets can be expected to result in 
capital being allocated more efficiently from an economic perspective. As a result, the volume of 
outbound CBA has been an increasing trend among Malaysian firms since 1990 (UNCTAD, 2014). 
 
Nonetheless, despite the popularity of growth strategies based on CBA, where it was reported that 
globally companies spent more than $2 trillion on all types of acquisitions every year (Bunce, 2013), the 
failure rates reported by several sources are high which are in the range of 70% to 90% (Rahim, Ahmad, 
Ahmad, & Rahim, 2013; Bunce, 2013; Christensen, Alton, Rising & Waldeck, 2011). More specifically 
for Malaysian market, PwC’s surveys show that 70% of the M&As fail in general (The Edge Malaysia, 
July 9, 2012).  
 
It is rather puzzling that given the high reported failure rate of CBA, the strategy is still widely pursued. 
Could it be that the performance measure used is not accurate enough to reflect the real value of CBA 
and/or that CBA indeed delivers higher value in firms with specific characteristics. As the essence of 
CBA for acquiring firms lies in achieving the long run goal of shareholders’ wealth maximization, it is 
crucial to assess the performance of CBA based on whether this restructuring generates value gains for 
shareholders of the acquirers, how these value gains have been created and achieved or failed.  
 
The novel contribution of this study is in terms of unveiling the performance of Malaysian CBA using a 
robust performance measure of wealth effects, which is the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns for one, two 
and three years following CBA activities and comparing the performance across different category of 
firms. 4 categorizations of firm were investigated, namely (1) Shariah-complaint status firms vs. 
conventional firms, (2) level of control in target firm (including Major vs. Minor acquisitions), (3) 
diversifying acquisitions, and (4) industry effect of acquiring firms. Shariah-complaint firm has an extra 
Shariah supervisory board compare to conventional firm. This Supervisory board is an independent body 
of monitoring the firm which can improve its performance. Major control in target firm can reduce agency 
cost which leads to maximize shareholder wealth. Diversified acquisition can also reduce risk. Therefore, 
these groups of firm expect to do better than conventional firms in CBA.     
 
The success and failure of these transactions are of great significance and have enormous consequences 
for the companies themselves as well as for the other groups in them (Sudarsanam, 2010). Thus, 
examination of the SWEfollowing CBA demands extensive research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Prior literatures reported that studies on SWE exhibit puzzling resultsdue to different type of samples, 
methods, time periods, and difference of the market contexts. Therefore, there is a need for further study 
on SWE.However, only a few studies were conducted on Malaysian acquiring firms’ SWE and these were 
mostly conducted on short run SWE (Rahim et al., 2016; Rahim et al., 2013, 2014). On the other hand, to 
the best of author’s knowledge, only the study by  Khin, Lee, and Yee (2012) was conducted on long run 
SWE. There are a few studies on SWE of firms following domestic merger and acquisition (M&A) as 
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well, for example, Peng and Isa (2012), Aik, Hassan, and Mohamad (2015), Shahar, Mohd, and Ishak 
(2016) and Mat Rahim and Ching Pok (2013). 
 
The only Malaysian long run SWE study of CBA by Khin et al. (2012) reported positive SWE using 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) considering different event windows including 60, 120 and 180 days 
during the period of 2004-2007. Nevertheless, the measurement of the long run SWE using CAR has 
some limitations for long event window. The limitations are mainly the bias, which includes new listing 
bias and rebalancing bias (Barber & Lyon, 1997; Basuil & Datta, 2015; Oler, Harrison, & Allen, 2008). 
Furthermore, their study is incomparable with most of the previous studies that used event windows of 12, 
24, and 36 months after acquisition for long run SWE (Banerjee, Banerjee, De, Jindra, & Mukhopadhyay, 
2014; Wang, Shih, & Lin, 2014). The period of the study was 2004-2007, which was relatively short. 
Consequently, the study of long run SWE of CBAs is still nascent in the Malaysian context. Therefore, it 
clearly shows the need for undertaking further examination of the profile of SWE of the acquiring firm 
following CBA in the long run from the Malaysian context. 
 
To the best of authors’ knowledge, there is hardly any evidence found considering the following aspects 
in the long run SWE following CBA in Malaysian context in the previous studies: (1) long run SWE of 
acquiring firm of post 12, 24 and 36 months, (2) percentage of firms (either gainer firms or loser firms), 
(3) SWE of Shariah-complaint status firms vs. conventional firms, (4) level of control in target firm 
(including Major vs. Minor acquisitions), (5) diversifying acquisitions, and  (6) industry effect of 
acquiring firms. 
 
3. Methodology 
Long-horizon event study used in this research  has a long history of development including the original 
one by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969). However, in order to get the best result, the state-of-the-art 
method based on recent and key studies on long run event study (Barber & Lyon, 1997; Fama, 1998; 
Jegadeesh & Karceski, 2009; Kothari & Warner, 1997, 2004; Lyon, Barber, & Tsai, 1999; Mitchell & 
Stafford, 2000; Viswanathan & Wei, 2008) is followed. 
 
The results of long run event studies are sensitive to both the methodology used and the benchmark 
employed (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Ibrahim, Uddin, Mohd, & Minai, 2013; Pontiff & 
Woodgate, 2008; Rau & Vermaelen, 1998). This is why, using appropriate method to calculate abnormal 
returns and comparing them to an appropriate benchmark are the two most important aspects of 
determining long run wealth effect. BHAR approach of post-event performance is used in this study 
employing characteristics-based benchmark using Euclidean distance method (Berry, Guillén, & Zhou, 
2010; Swaminathan, Murshed, & Hulland, 2008; Van Heerde, Gijsbrechts, & Pauwels, 2008). The 
benchmark characteristics are firm size and firm growth. Firm size and firm growth are measured by 
market capitalization and book to market value respectively. Following are the steps of calculating 
BHAR. 
 
Calculation of Monthly (t) Raw Return (rit) for each firm (i) from Return Index. 
 
    
           
       
 
 
                      (3.1) 
Calculating BHAR is to calculate the holding period return of firm i for the analysis period in months (T), 
        ∏   
 
   
       (3.2) 
Where, rit is the monthly raw return of firm i in month t. Using the same calculation, the holding period 
return for the benchmark b is,  
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        ∏       
 
   
   (3.3) 
Now, the buy-and-hold abnormal return for each firm i in month t after benchmark adjustment is the 
difference between the buy-and-hold returns of the firm and the benchmark, 
                     (3.4) 
which is used for calculating the value weighted (wi) mean of the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
for month t as follows, 
      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  ∑  
  
   
        (3.5) 
The test of statistical significance is conducted using three procedures for the purpose of robustness and 
comparability with other studies. These are: (1) conventional t-statistic, (2) skewness adjusted t-statistic, 
and (3) bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic, suggested by Lyon et al. (1999) and developed by 
Johnson (1978).  
 
Moreover, using parametric tests (such as conventional t-statistics, skewness adjusted t-statistics, 
bootstrapping skewness adjusted t-statistics and Multivariate Analysis of Variance) and non-parametric 
statistical (such as Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) tools were used to analyze the data and test the 
hypotheses regarding acquiring firms’ SWE impacted by CBA deals. 
 
Malaysian acquiring firms’ CBA deals were identified from Thomson Reuters Eikon database. After that, 
on the basis of these deals, firm’s related data were collected from DataStream database. Thereafter, total 
sample were 332, 284 and 176 for 12, 24 and 36 months of long run SWEs, respectively. Considering 36 
months as a long run post acquisition period, final sample is 176 for 12, 24 and 36 months which make 
uniform across time (such as 12, 24 and 36 months). Stock return, firm size, market to book value related 
data are also collated form DataStream database. Shariah-compliant status firms were identified from 
Bursa Malaysia website. Industry classification is defined from DataStream database using Industry four 
group. Level of acquisition in target firm, and diversifying or unrelated industry deals were identified 
from Thomson Reuters Eikon database. 
 
4.Findings and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics of the variables are reported in Table 4.1 and 4.2. However, only the firms with 
available data for all variables were included in the analysis as can be seen in Table 4.1 and 4.2. The 
research employs cross-sectional data analysis of 176 CBA deals-firms observations for the period of 
2004-2015 considering 12 months, 24 months and 36 months post acquisition wealth effect of acquiring 
firms. 
 
Panel A: Equally weighted BHAR explains outcome variable (shareholder’s wealth effect of acquiring 
firms) following 12 month, 24 months and 36 months respectively. Panel B: Value weighted BHAR is for 
the same. Panel C: Comparison between groups within sample for firms and across time period (such 12 
months, 24 months and 36 months). 
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Table 4.1: Outcome variables 
Variable No of 
CBA deals 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Equally weighted BHAR 
BHAR12EW 176 0.0085014 0.7151507 -1.718748 5.523083 
BHAR24EW 176 -0.028017 1.04188 -2.28526 8.157512 
BHAR36EW 176 -0.1150517 1.266338 -5.528052 7.925235 
Panel B: Value weighted BHAR 
BHAR12VW 176 0.000038 0.0023817 -0.0174151 0.0189255 
BHAR24VW 176 0.0000184 0.0024892 -0.019994 0.0152472 
BHAR36VW 176 0.0002857 0.0042072 -0.0256878 0.0270278 
Note: BHAR12EW=Equally weighted Buy-and-hold abnormal returns of post-12 months, BHAR24EW= Equally weighted 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns of post-24 months, BHAR36EW= Equally weighted Buy-and-hold abnormal returns of post-36 
months, BHAR12VW= Value weighted Buy-and-hold abnormal returns of post-12 months, , BHAR24VW= Value weighted 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns of post-24 months, BHAR36VW= Value weighted Buy-and-hold abnormal returns of post-36 
months. 
 
 (i): Panel C: Group-wise sample 
 
(i) Shariah-complaint status of acquiring firms (SCS) 
Seventy-three percent (73%) deal of acquiring firm has Shariah-complaint status which is 128 out 176. So 
most of deals’ acquiring has shariah-complaint status in the Bursa Malaysia following CBA. 
 
Table 4.2 (i): Shariah-complaint status firms 
Firm Shariah status Freq. Percent Cum. 
Conventional firms 48 27 27.27 
Shariah-complain status firms 128 73 100 
Total 176 100  
 
(ii) Level of acquisition (LA) in target firms 
Eighty-five percent (85%) of CBA deals which control in target firms - is greater than or equal to 33%. It 
means Malaysian acquiring firms like to acquire major control in target firm. 
 
Table 4.2 (ii): Level of acquisition 
Level of acquisitions Freq. Percent Cum. 
Minor acquisition 27 15 15.34 
Major acquisition 149 85 100 
Total 176 100  
Note: if a CBA deal of acquiring firm acquires the target firm more than or equal to 33%, the deal is considered as major 
acquisition, otherwise it is minor acquisition in target firms. 
 
(iii) Diversifying acquisition strategy (DAS) 
83% of CBA deals of acquiring firms acquire the target which is not related industry with acquiring 
industry. It shows that acquiring firm like to buy unrelated industry of target firms. 
 
 
Table 4.2 (iii): Diversifying acquisition 
 
Diversifying acquisition Freq. Percent Cum. 
Related industry acquisition 30 17 17.05 
Unrelated industry acquisition 146 83 100 
Total 176 100  
Note: if a CBA deal of acquiring firm acquires an unrelated industry’s target, it is considered as diversifying acquisitions 
strategy, otherwise it is related industry acquisitions. 
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(iv) Acquiring firm’s industry 
Eighty-nine percent (89%) of CBA deals of acquiring industry is industrial which is 157 out of 176. Most 
of firm go for CBA deal which are from industrial industry. 
Table 4.2 (iv): Industry of acquiring firms 
 
Industry of acquiring firms Freq. Percent Cum. 
Non-industrial industry 19 11 10.8 
Industrial Industry 157 89 100 
Total 176 100  
Note: if a CBA deal of acquiring firm is from industrial is Industrial industry it is considered from 
industrial industry acquisition, otherwise it is non-industrial industry acquisition. 
 
4.2 Findings 
4.2.1 Gainer vs loser deals  
On an average, 40% deals of acquiring firms have increased their shareholders wealth while 60% of deal 
of acquiring firms have decreased their shareholders’ wealth after 36 months of acquisition as shown in 
Table 4.3 (i). So it is evident that 60% CBA deals of acquiring failed to create SWE. It can be said that 
failure rate exceeds success rate. The finding is similar to the previous studies by Rahim et al. (2013) and 
Aybar and Ficici (2009). 
 
Table 4.3 (i):   Gainer and loser deal status 
Gain and loser deals BHAR12 BHAR24 BHAR36 
Loser (%) 59 59 60 
Gainer (%) 41 41 40 
 
4.2.2 Acquiring firm shareholders’ wealth effect 
Using equally weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR-EW), SWE was found significantly 
positive in 12 months while after 12 months, it was found significantly negative and gradually negative. 
So it is evident that SWE is positive in shorter period but negative in the longer period as shown in Table 
4.3 (ii). On the other hand, Using value weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR-VW), SWE was 
found significantly positive following 12 months, 24 months and 36 months. It is evident that SWE is 
positive in the long run due to the change of method of measurement as shown in Table 4.3 (iii). 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 4.1 the SWE is found to show be showing an upward trend using BHAR-
VW model while SWE is to be showing a downward trend using BHAR-EW model for 1-36 months. So 
the results of SWE is showing a mixed effect due to methods to measure it. 
The results of SWE is found similar to previous studies. For example, the results of SWE is mixed due to 
use of different methods of measurements (such as Basuil & Datta, 2015; Khin et al., 2012). In line with 
this, several previous studies found that SWE is positive in the shorter period such as day or month to 
year (Bhagat et al., 2011; Khin et al., 2012) while others (Bertrand & Betschinger, 2012; Wang et al., 
2014) found a negative one in the longer period ( such as 12 months to 36 months post acquisition). 
Moreover, some studies report positive SWE of acquiring firms in long run (Banerjee et al., 2014; Francis 
et al., 2014). 
 
Table 4.3 (ii): BHAR-EW 
Post Period Sample Size BHAR-EW (%) t-statistics 
tc
a 
tsa
b 
tbsa
c 
1 to 12 Months 176 0.8501 15.77*** 7.06*** 9.37*** 
1 to 24 Months 176 -2.802 -35.67*** 8.67*** 8.67*** 
1 to 36 Months 176 -11.50 -120.53*** 13.03*** 9.70*** 
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Note: BHAR-EW= Equally weighted Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
*, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
tc
a
=conventional t-statistics. 
tsa
b
= Skewness adjusted t-statistics. 
tbsa
c
= bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics. 
 
Table 4.3 (iii): BHAR-VW 
Post Period Sample Size BHAR-VW 
(%) 
t-statistics 
tc
a
 tsa
b
 Tbsa
c
 
1 to 12 Months 176 0.0038 21.17*** 2.45*** 6.58*** 
1 to 24 Months 176 0.0018 9.79*** -5.53*** -27.43*** 
1 to 36 Months 176 0.0286 90.08*** -2.09*** 5.48*** 
Note: BHAR-VW= Value weighted Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
*, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
tc
a
=conventional t-statistics. 
tsa
b
= Skewness adjusted t-statistics.  
tbsa
c
= bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistics. 
 
Graph of BHAR-EW and BHAR-VW 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Monthly BHAR (equally weighted and value weighted) 
 
4.2.3 Comparison within groups and over time of SWE 
 
Independent group t-test (for parametric and non-parametric test) is designed to compare means of same 
variable between two groups. Ideally, these subjects are randomly selected from a larger population of 
subjects. The test assumes that variances for the two populations are the same. The interpretation for p-
value is the two-tailed p-value computed using the t distribution.  It is the probability of observing a 
greater absolute value of t under the null hypothesis. If the p-value is less than the pre-specified alpha 
level (usually 0.05 or 0.01, here the former) it can be concluded that mean difference between group1 and 
group2 is statistically significantly different from zero. In the same way for Multivariate Analysis of 
Variance (MANOVA), the p-value associated with the F statistic of a given effect and test statistic. The 
null hypothesis that a given predictor has no effect on either of the outcomes is evaluated with regard to 
this p-value.  For a given alpha level (usually 0.05 or 0.01, here the former), if the p-value is less than 
alpha, the null hypothesis is rejected. If not, then we fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
However, the results of SWE indicate that there is no statistically significant difference between the mean 
SWE for Shariah vs. Conventional firms, Major vs. Minor, and Diversifying vs. similar acquisition as 
shown by  independent group t-test (parametric test) in Table 4.4 (i) and Table 4.4 (ii). Moreover, using 
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non-parametric test such as Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, the results this study found are the same for 
each group of samples. But, acquiring firm SWE differs across industry when SWE is measured by 
BHAR-VW. Furthermore, the results of MANOVA also indicate that SWE differs from industry to 
industry. 
 
Table 4.4 (i): BHAR-EW 
 
Factors Difference 
mean 
Group Total 
observations 
Independent group t-
test 
Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test 
MANOVA 
1 0 t-value p-value z-value
  
p-value f-
value 
p-
value 
SCS BHAR12EW 128 48 176 -0.3588 0.7202 -0.169 0.8655 0.96 0.41 
BHAR24EW 128 48 176 0.0491 0.9609 0.462 0.6443 
BHAR36EW 128 48 176 -0.8544 0.3940 -0.688 0.4917 
LA BHAR12EW 149 27 176 -0.6601 0.5101 -1.102 0.2704 0.44 0.72 
BHAR24EW 149 27 176 -0.0732 0.9417 -0.454 0.6501 
BHAR36EW 149 27 176 -0.3792 0.7050 -0.946 0.3440 
DAS BHAR12EW 146 30 176 -0.2364 0.8134 0.956 0.3391 1.09 0.35 
BHAR24EW 146 30 176 -1.2954 0.1969 -0.602 0.5472 
BHAR36EW 146 30 176 -1.1137 0.2669 -1.141 0.2539 
AI BHAR12EW 157 19 176 1.4101 0.1603 1.375 0.1690 1.1 0.34 
BHAR24EW 157 19 176 0.8157 0.4158 0.961 0.3367 
BHAR36EW 157 19 176 1.2377 0.2175 0.694 0.4879 
Note:1= Shariah complaint-status (SCS) or Major acquisition (LA)or Related industry of acquisition (RI) or material industry 
of acquirer (Industry) or region in Asia (Region), Otherwise=0. 
*, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
Table 4.4 (ii):BHAR-WV 
Factors Difference 
mean 
Group Total 
observations 
Independent group t-
test 
Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test 
MANOVA 
1 0 t-value p-value z-value p-
value 
f-
value 
p-value 
SCS BHAR12WV 128 48 176 -0.4824 0.6301 0.249 0.8033 1.29 0.28 
BHAR24WV 128 48 176 0.263 0.7929 1.581 1.581 
BHAR36WV 128 48 176 0.9978 0.3197 0.515 0.6066 
LA BHAR12WV 149 27 176 0.262 0.7936 -1.176 0.2395 2.03 0.11 
BHAR24WV 149 27 176 -1.7119 0.0887* -1.250 0.2113 
BHAR36WV 149 27 176 -0.5026 0.6159 -1.234 0.2174 
DAS BHAR12WV 146 30 176 -0.1686 0.8663 0.531 0.5953 0.16 0.93 
BHAR24WV 146 30 176 -0.2891 0.7728 -0.508 0.6118 
BHAR36WV 146 30 176 -0.5788 0.5635 -1.326 0.1849 
AI BHAR12WV 157 19 176 -2.9451 0.0037*** -0.155 0.8769 5.43 0.00*** 
BHAR24WV 157 19 176 -3.5896 0.0004*** -0.594 0.5528 
BHAR36WV 157 19 176 -3.9463 0.0001*** -0.899 0.3688 
Note:1= shariah complain-status (SCS) or Major acquisition (LA)or Related industry of acquisition (RI) or material industry 
of acquirer (Industry) or region in Asia (Region), Otherwise=0. 
*, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we made an attempt to empirically investigate long run SWE of Malaysian acquiring firms 
follow cross-border acquisitions. Our investigation reveals that most of the CBA deals of acquiring firm 
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failed to create SWE in the long run. As empirically evidenced, only 40% CBA deals create SWE. As a 
whole, the results of Malaysian acquiring firms’ SWE is mixed and could be attributed to the difference in 
the methods of measurement used. It is evident that SWE is positive in the short run. In the long run, 
SWE is positive if we use value weighted BHAR model while it is negative if we use equally weighted 
BHAR model. Furthermore, acquiring firm SWEs differ across industry. In contrast, there is no difference 
of SWE between Shariah complaint and conventional firms, major control firm and minor control firms, 
diversifying firm and related acquisition firms, etc. Finally, it is concluded that increasing long run SWE 
can be one of the goals of an acquiring firm. We recommend that the firms from industrial industry can go 
for CBA with the goal of increasing long run SWE. Also, it may consider CBA deals for buying raw 
material, expanding the market, and setting up new business in foreign markets.  
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